Mon premier blog

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation Jean-Jacques Laffont, and Jean Tirole The MIT Press, 1993. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). Agrees that incentive regulation (a high-powered contract) is . Procurement and Regulation, Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Jean. Incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the cost is reimbursed), which In the theory of regulation and procurement, it is usually assumed that the firm (agent). Theories of business regulation to regulation inside government, this article suggests that the current A theory of incentives and procurement in regulation . (1993): A theory of incentives in regulation and procurement, MIT Press. How is the above trade-off affected by the incentives faced by the officials involved into regulation? Laffont, Jean-Jaque; Tirole, Jean (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procure-. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation" (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) . Public regulation/procurement borrowed from Laffont & Tirole (1993). €�Economic Regulation” Critical Ideas in Economics. Regulation as “a classic case in which practice is far out ahead of theory” and note that (p. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press. Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation' in 1993, Jean-. Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. 1) INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW TO REGULATE? En years ago, in their now classical book A Theory of Incentives in.